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Abstract​—On 2 May, 2019, during the UK local elections, an e-voting trial was conducted in                             
Gateshead, using a touch-screen end-to-end verifiable e-voting system. This was the first trial                         
of verifiable e-voting for polling station voting in the UK, and it presented a case study to                                 
envisage the future of e-voting.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An electronic voting (e-voting) system uses      
electronic technologies to record, store and      
process ballots in a digital form. In general,        
there are two types of e-voting systems. One        
type is designed for local voting in a polling         
station, where a touch-screen machine, called      
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), is typically      
used to record votes. The other type is        
designed for remote voting, where voters can       
cast their votes from anywhere via the Internet. 
Today, e-voting has already been deployed       
in a number of countries. It is used in many          
states in America in various forms, e.g., based        
on optical scan or DRE. In India, a fully         
electronic voting system called Electronic     
Voting Machine has been used in all national        
elections since 2004. Brazil started its      
DRE-based elections in 2002. In 2007, Estonia       
allowed Internet voting for national elections      
for the first time. In 2019 during the Estonian         
parliamentary election, 44% of ballots were      
cast using Internet voting. 
The e-voting systems as currently used in        
real-world elections in the above countries      
generally work like a trusted “black-box” that is        
critically dependent on the integrity of the       
internal software implementation. However,    
voters have no means to verify the internal        
software. For example, as demonstrated by      
Springall et al. [1], if the server software in the          
Estonian Internet voting system had been      
compromised, the integrity of the whole      
 election would have been lost without voters       
even knowing it. Publishing the source code       
can help promote trust, but it cannot resolve        
the fundamental problem as one cannot      
guarantee that the same software is used       
unmodified on the election day.  
To address the trust problem on e-voting        
software, Rivest and Wack first proposed the       
notion of ​software independence​: “a voting      
system is software-independent if an     
undetected change or error in its software       
cannot cause an undetectable change or error       
in an election outcome” [2]. The      
software-independence principle essentially   
requires that a voting system should guarantee       
security without depending on details of the       
internal software implementation, since voters     
have means to access and verify the software. 
There are various approaches to build a        
software-independent voting system [2],    
among which the most promising one involves       
applying cryptography to make the voting      
system end-to-end (E2E) verifiable. Being E2E      
verifiable encompasses the following aspects: 
 
1. Cast-as-intended​: a voter can verify     
that a ballot is cast correctly for the        
intended candidate. 
2. Recorded-as-cast​: a voter can verify     
that a cast ballot is recorded correctly       
in the system. 
3. Tallied-as-recorded​: a public observer    
can verify that all the recorded ballots       
are tallied correctly. 
 
A system that satisfies the above requirements       
is said to be E2E verifiable. Besides       
verifiability, an E2E voting system must also       
preserve voter privacy, ensuring that the ability       
to verify that their vote cannot be misused to         
reveal how they have voted to a third party,         
say a coercer. An overview of the E2E        
verifiable voting systems in a real-world setting       
can be found in [3]. 
The potential of an E2E voting system for         
real-world elections has been demonstrated in      
a number of studies. In 2009, Helios, an E2E         
Internet voting system, was used to elect the        
university president of the Université     
Catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Belgium [4].       
Scantegrity, a scanner-based E2E voting     
system [5], was adopted in the municipal       
elections of Takoma Park, USA in 2009 and        
2011. In 2014, Prêt à Voter (PaV), based on a          
hybrid method using a touch-screen machine      
and a scanner, was adopted in the 2014        
Victoria State election in Australia [6].  
Although progress has been made in E2E        
verifiable voting, large-scale deployments of     
this technology are still limited due to two main         
reasons. First, most of the E2E voting systems        
require a group of tallying authorities (TAs)       
who are supposedly trustworthy individuals     
with computing and cryptographic expertise to      
perform the complex decryption and tallying      
operations. Finding and managing such TAs      
has proved to be difficult [4]. Second, the E2E         
systems tested in polling stations, such as       
Scantegrity and PaV primarily use paper at the        
voting stage. Although they improve the      
system security by introducing E2E verifiability,      
the complex handling of paper ballots (e.g.,       
using a special pen in Scantegrity and tearing        
the ballot into halves in PaV) is not any easier          
than the traditional paper ballots. 
Recent research in this field has shown that         
it is possible to construct ​fully electronic E2E        
verifiable voting systems ​without involving any      
TA, using a new paradigm called      
“self-enforcing e-voting” (SEEV) [7]. The     
removal of TAs can significantly simplify      
election management and make the system      
much more practical than before. The first       
SEEV system, called DRE-i due to Hao et al.         
[7], adopts a pre-computation strategy to      
encrypt ballots before the election in a       
structured way such that multiplying the      
ciphertexts after the election will cancel out       
random factors and hence allow everyone to       
verify the integrity of the tallying result without        
TAs. A prototype of DRE-i has been used for         
mobile phone-based classroom voting [8]. The      
second SEEV system, called DRE-ip due to       
Shahandashti and Hao [9], adopts an      
alternative real-time computation strategy to     
encrypt ballots during voting, while keeping an       
aggregated form of the random factors in       
memory. When the election has finished, the       
 system publishes the final aggregation of the       
random factors along with other audit data to        
allow the public to verify the tallying integrity        
without involving any TAs. By removing the       
need to store pre-computed ballots, DRE-ip      
provides a stronger guarantee of vote privacy       
than DRE-i and is particularly suited for polling        
station voting. A touch-screen based     
implementation of DRE-ip for polling station      
voting was trialed in the campus of Newcastle        
University in May 2017 with positive feedback       
from voters. 
Based on the initial success of the campus         
trial, the research team reached out to the        
Gateshead council in Newcastle, UK, with a       
proposal to trial the system with real voters in a          
realistic polling station environment. This     
proposal was supported by the electoral      
officials in the Gateshead council, and was       
subsequently approved by the council. It was       
agreed that an e-voting trial would be held on 2          
May, 2019 at the Gateshead Civic Center       
polling station as part of the UK local elections. 
This trial differs from all previous e-voting        
pilots in the UK in that the trialed system is          
E2E verifiable rather than a “black-box”.      
Outside the UK, this trial also represents the        
first time that a ​fully-electronic E2E verifiable       
voting system was tested in a polling station by         
real voters. It was hoped that the results of this          
trial would present a useful case study for        
researchers as well as election law and policy        
makers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.          
Section 2 explains the DRE-ip system that was        
used in the Gateshead trial. Section 3 gives        
details of the trial. Section 4 discusses the        
voter feedback and results. Finally, Section 5       
concludes the paper with suggestions for      
future work.  
 
2. DRE-IP VOTING PROTOCOL 
 
High-level view. ​At a high level, a       
self-enforcing e-voting (SEEV) system can be      
explained using the analogy of a picture.       
Imagine an election as a picture that is formed         
of millions of pixels. Every voter holds a key to          
one pixel. The voter’s privacy is protected       
because each individual pixel does not reveal       
the value of their vote. However, when all        
pixels are pieced together, they collectively      
show a picture that is the election tally.        
Everyone will be able to compute/verify the       
tally without involving any TAs. However, only       
the tally, not an individual vote or any partial         
tally, can be learnt. If an attacker attempts to         
modify pixels or the tally, the tampering will be         
publicly noticeable since the mathematical     
relations between the pixels will fail to be        
verified. DRE-ip [9] is an instantiation of a        
SEEV system based on real-time computation      
(as opposed to DRE-i [7] that is based on         
pre-computation). The protocol is summarized     
below. 
 
Setup. Let and be two large primes  p   q      
where divides . The protocol operates q   p − 1     
in the subgroup of of prime order . In this    Z*p     q    
subgroup, are two random generators g1   g2     
whose discrete logarithm relationship is     
unknown. In the implementation, this is      
realized by first choosing a non-identity      
element as and then computing based  g1     g2   
on using a one-way hash function with       
inclusion of election specific information in the       
input, such as the date, title and questions. For         
simplicity, the DRE-ip protocol is described      
here for a single candidate (Yes/No) election. It        
can be easily extended for supporting multiple       
candidates as shown in [9]. 
 
Voting. ​After authentication, a voter casts a       
vote on a DRE machine in two steps. First,         
they are presented with a “Yes” or “No” option         
for the displayed candidate on the DRE       
screen. Once the voter makes a choice, the        
DRE prints the first part of the receipt,        
containing , , where is a i  Ri = g2
ri  gZ i = g1
ri 
1
vi   i    
unique ballot index number, is a random    ri     
number chosen uniformly from , and    1, q ][  − 1   
is either 1 or 0 (corresponding to “Yes” orvi           
“No”). The ciphertext data also comes with a        
zero knowledge proof (ZKP) to prove that       Ri  
and  are well-formed [9].Z i   
In the second step, the voter has the option          
to either confirm or cancel the selection. In        
 
 case of “confirm”, the DRE updates the       
aggregated values and in memory as in  t   s        
Equation 1, deletes individual values and     ri   vi 
, and marks the ballot as confirmed on the         
receipt.  
 and t = ∑
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ri (1) 
In case of “cancel”, the DRE reveals and       ri   vi  
on the receipt, marks it a cancelled ballot and         
prompts the voter to choose again. The voter        
can check if the printed matches their     vi    
previous selection and can dispute it if it does         
not. The voter can cancel as many ballots as         
they wish but can only cast one confirmed        
ballot. Since voting is anonymous, the machine       
cannot guess if, after having printed the first        
part of the receipt, the voter is going to         
"confirm" or "cancel". 
After voting, the voter leaves the voting        
booth with one receipt for the confirmed ballot        
and zero or more receipts for the cancelled        
ballots. All data on the receipts are digitally        
signed and are also available on a public        
election website. To ensure the vote is       
recorded, the voter just needs to check if the         
same receipt has been published on the       
election website. 
 
Tallying. ​Once the election has finished, the       
DRE publishes the final values and on the     t   s    
election website, in addition to all the receipts.        
Anyone will be able to verify the tallying        
integrity by checking the published audit data,       
in particular, whether the two equalities in       
Equation 2 hold for the confirmed ballots: 
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3. E-VOTING TRIAL 
 
Ethics. ​The trial was ethically approved by the        
Electoral Services of the Gateshead council      
and the Research Ethics Committee of the       
University of Warwick. Participation in this trial       
was entirely voluntary. To avoid any perception       
of likely bribery, no financial compensation was       
allowed to pay for the voter’s time, not even         
free coffee or tea. However, sweets were       
permitted. So, two packs of sweets (about £2.5        
for 200 pieces) were purchased and made       
available to all voters regardless whether they       
took part in the trial or not.  
Since the security of DRE-ip has been peer         
reviewed in a published paper, the main aim of         
the trial was to evaluate the usability of the         
system and its public acceptance in      
comparison to traditional paper ballots. The      
initial plan was to conduct the trial as an exit          
poll, so the tallying results could have been        
compared with the official election results.      
However, during the ethics review, a concern       
was raised that since an e-voting device was        
never used in any exit poll before, some voters         
might confuse the trial with the real election.        
To address this concern, it was decided to use         
dummy candidate names for the trial. The       
voting question and the dummy candidate      
names were provided by the Council based on        
a sample paper ballot used in an election        
education program. During the briefing, voters      
were explicitly informed that the candidate      
names used in the trial were dummy ones.  
 
Implementation. ​The DRE-ip system used in      
the trial was implemented over an elliptic curve        
(NIST P-256) rather than a finite field setting        
for better efficiency. This does not change the        
protocol specification. The system consisted of      
a server and multiple clients. Each DRE client        
comprised a touch-screen Tablet (Google Pixel      
C 10.2 inch) connected to a thermal printer        
(Epson TPM-P80). Two clients were installed      
in the trial venue, supporting voting in parallel.        
The clients were connected to a remote server        
where all the cryptographic operations were      
performed. The network connection was     
provided via a wireless dongle (Huawei 4G).       
Although the Gateshead Civic Center provided      
free wi-fi to all visitors on the election day, the          
4G dongle was used for the assurance of more         
reliable Internet connectivity. All the electronic      
devices were off-the-shelf equipment and     
could work in battery-only mode. Portable      
power banks were included in the setup in        
case the electrical power became unavailable      
in the venue. Therefore, other than requiring a        
physical space, the trial setup had minimum       
dependence on the IT infrastructure in the       
polling station. Figure 1 shows the setup on        
 the election day. Since it was a trial, the DRE          
clients were placed in an open space. In a real          
election, each should be put in a separate        
voting booth. 
 
 
 
   Figure 1. Trial setup at the polling station 
 
Election day. ​The trial was chosen to be held         
at Gateshead Civic Center, which was the       
busiest polling station in Gateshead. On 2       
May, 2019, the Gateshead Civic Center polling       
station opened at 6:30 am for voting. Voters        
walked into the polling station (inside a hall as         
indicated in Figure 1) to vote as normal using         
paper ballots. Upon exiting the polling station,       
they were invited to take part in a voluntary         
trial using e-voting. Ninety-four voters (out of a        
total of about 200 voters who attended that        
polling station) participated in the trial.  
​After the voter consented to participate, they        
were first asked if they would like to watch a          
short 1-minute video demonstration on how to       
use the system. About one third of the        
participants chose to watch it, while the       
majority decided to vote straightaway.  
To cast a vote, the voter first picked up a           
folded slip of paper with a random 9-digit        
passcode from a glass jar. This passcode       
would allow the voter to log in to the DRE to           
cast a vote while remaining anonymous. With       
the passcode, the voter chose one of the        
provided DRE clients and started their voting       
session. Figure 2 shows a series of       
screenshots to illustrate the voting process.      
First, the voter logged in to the DRE using the          
9-digit passcode. The screen then displayed a       
list of candidates. The voter touched the       
screen to select a candidate. Meanwhile the       
thermal printer printed the first part of the        
receipt. Based on [8], only a truncated hash        
(50 characters in Crockford’s base-32     
encoding) was printed on the receipt, while the        
complete crypto data including the digital      
signature was published at the election      
website. Next, the voter needed to either       
"confirm" or "cancel" the selection. If “cancel”       
was chosen, the DRE client would return to the         
initial screen of the candidate selection and       
print the second part of the receipt for the just          
cancelled ballot (Fig. 3A). If “confirm” was       
chosen, the voting session would terminate      
and the DRE client would print the rest of the          
receipt for the just confirmed ballot (Fig. 3B).  
 
 
      ​(1) login  
  
 
 ​     (2) List of candidates  
 
  
 
       (3) Select candidate  
 
 
      (4) Cancel selection 
 
 
  (​5) Select candidate again  
 
 
(6) Confirm selection 
 
Figure 2. DRE screenshots during voting 
 
         A. Cancelled ballot           B. Confirmed ballot 
Figure 3. Example of receipts in the       
proof-of-concept implementation 
 
After the trial, voters were provided with an        
(optional) questionnaire to provide anonymous     
feedback. Results of the feedback will be       
presented in the next section.  
The polling station closed at 10:00 pm to         
mark the official end of the election.       
Immediately after 10:00 pm, the tallying results       
for the e-voting trial were published at the        
election website along with full audit data       
(which can be downloaded as an XML file).        
The audit data was subsequently checked by       
the research team and was found to be verified         
successfully. The same verification could be      
performed by anyone using the provided      
open-source software or any independently     
developed software. The system recorded 93      
confirmed ballots and 11 cancelled ballots,      
with a total of 94 participating voters. The        
apparent absence of one confirmed ballot was       
because one voter logged in to the tablet but         
chose to exit and eventually not to vote (this         
voter came to the polling station to cast a         
protest vote and wanted to do the same on the          
e-voting system).  
 
4. PARTICIPANT STUDY DESIGN 
 
Questionnaire design. ​The main part of the       
questionnaire was designed to assess the      
usability of the voting process based on a        
common set of System Usability Scale (SUS)       
statements first developed by John Brooke      
[10]. Respondents indicate their agreement or      
disagreement with each statement using a      
five-point Likert scale, where 1 = “strongly       
 disagree”, 2 = “disagree”, 3 = “neutral”, 4 =         
“agree” and 5 = “strongly agree”. Based on        
pilot testing prior to the trial, it was found that          
the first statement was potentially confusing.      
The original statement was “​I think that I would         
like to use this system frequently​”, and it was         
changed to “​I think that I would like to use this           
system in future elections​” to better fit the        
context of the trial. The rest of the statements         
were left unchanged.  
The usability assessment was focused on       
the voting process instead of the verification       
process. This was for two main reasons. First,        
since the trial was conducted with real voters        
in a busy polling station, the time available for         
each participant to vote and to complete a        
survey was limited. Second, while voting is       
mandatory, verification is an optional     
operation. In practice, dedicated auditors may      
be employed to verify “cast as intended” by        
casting cancelled ballots at any time during the        
election day; voters may give receipts to a        
helper in the polling station to verify “recorded        
as cast” by checking if the same receipts are         
published at the election website; anyone with       
access to the election website is able to verify         
“tallied as recorded” by using the open-source       
software to check the published receipts and       
the tally. Hence, none of these verification       
operations is mandatory for an ordinary voter.       
The assessment of the usability for the       
verification process will be done in future work.  
In addition to the SUS questions, the        
questionnaire also collected demographic    
information about the participant and their      
background, including gender, age, education,     
experience of using computer/touch-screen    
devices, and whether or not they had watched        
the video demo before voting.  
The last part of the questionnaire asked the         
participant “based on your experience of using       
paper ballots and e-voting, which system do       
you prefer”? Participants were asked to      
indicate their preference on a 5-point scale,       
namely, (1) strongly prefer paper, (2) prefer       
paper, (3) neutral, (4) prefer e-voting and (5)        
strongly prefer e-voting. Participants could     
optionally write free text to explain their choice.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Demographics. Based on 93 returned     
questionnaires, the gender distributions among     
the participants were 39.8% “female”, 53.7%      
“male”, 1.1% “other” and 3.2% “prefer not to        
say“. The age distributions were 1.1% “below       
20”, 8.8% “20-29”, 27.5% “30-39”, 24.2%      
“40-49”, 23.1% “50-59”, 13.2% “above 60” and       
2.2% “prefer not to say”. While 11.3% of the         
participants attended “secondary school”,    
others vary among “college” (28.1%),     
“undergraduate degree” (22.5%),   
“postgraduate degree” (34.8%) and “Prefer not      
to say” (3.4%). Experience of using computer       
or touch-screen devices ranged from “never”      
(3.4%), “occasionally” (6.7%), to “sometimes”     
(4.5%), “often” (30.3%) and “extensively”     
(55.1%). Only 34.8% of the participants      
indicated they had watched the video demo       
prior to voting.  
 
Completion of voting. ​All participants were      
able to complete voting without error. In       
general, a 9-digit passcode is all that was        
needed for a voter to carry out voting by         
themselves by following the on-screen     
instructions. Only one voter encountered     
difficulty in touch-screen voting and asked the       
research team for help. This voter pressed the        
tablet screen really hard like a push button, but         
the touch screen did not respond under hard        
pressing. The issue was resolved by advising       
the voter to touch the screen more gently. It         
turned out that this particular voter had no prior         
experience of using any touch-screen device. 
 
SUS scores. ​Using the SUS computation      
method [10], the mean SUS score was 87.9        
(the standard deviation or STD was 13.8). By        
the commonly used criteria [11], this score is        
considered “excellent” in usability. It is higher       
than the reported SUS score of 76 for Helios,         
60 for PaV, 58 for Scangrity, and is        
comparable to 89 for STAR-vote [12]. It is        
worth noting that the user study in [12] was         
conducted in a lab environment with 30       
recruited volunteers (paid $25 each), while the       
Gateshead trial involved 94 real voters in a        
 
 real polling station with no payment for each        
participant.  
Based on the analysis using the Spearman        
correlation method, the SUS score is found to        
be uncorrelated with the age, gender or       
education background. However, it is positively      
correlated with the voter’s experience of using       
computer/touch-screen devices (Spearman   
correlation coefficient , and two-tailed  .28ρ = 0    
). It is inversely correlated with the.008p = 0        
watching of the video demo prior to voting (        
, ): those who chose to− .35ρ = 0  .001p = 0      
watch the video scored lower in SUS. This is         
counter-intuitive, but may be due to a       
self-selection effect: since watching the video      
was a voluntary choice, those who opted to        
watch it tended to be those who felt less         
comfortable with touch-screen e-voting. This is      
corroborated by the negative correlation     
between watching the video and the voter       
preference: those who chose to watch the       
video were more in favor of paper than        
e-voting ( , ).− .235ρ = 0 .027p = 0  
 
Voting time. ​The voting time was recorded       
from the moment that the voter started       
entering the passcode to the finish of the        
voting session. It ranged from the minimum of        
10 seconds to the maximum of 116 seconds        
with an average value of 33 seconds (STD =         
17 seconds). This compares favorably with      
previous studies, which report mean voting      
time 450 seconds for Helios, 550 seconds for        
PaV, 620 seconds for Scantegrity and 272       
seconds for STAR-Vote [12]. The substantially      
shorter voting time for DRE-ip is due to two         
factors: 1) the touch-screen interface was      
entirely electronic without involving any manual      
handling of paper ballots as in other systems;        
and 2) the "confirm/cancel" choice was      
smoothly integrated into the voting process as       
a natural voter-initiated auditing step. Indeed,      
after the voter entered the passcode, they       
typically took only 2 touches on the screen to         
cast a vote. More touches were needed only        
when the voter opted to cancel the vote and         
re-start from the initial screen. Overall, the       
response time for interacting with a touch       
screen is much quicker than filling in a physical         
paper ballot by hand.  
 
Voter preference. ​Between the traditional     
paper ballots and the trialed DRE-ip system,       
there was a clear preference among voters for        
the latter, as summarized in Figure 4. The        
choice of preference was positively correlated      
with the SUS score ( , ),    .59ρ = 0  .000p = 0  
which suggests that usability is one key factor        
in deciding the voter preference. 
  
 
(1) Counts of voter preferences 
 
(2) Correlation with SUS scores 
Figure 4. Summary of voter preferences 
 
Among those who preferred or strongly       
preferred e-voting (55 in total), 48 of them        
provided written comments. Three main     
reasons can be summarized from the provided       
comments. The dominant reason seems to be       
the ease of use: 30 voters (out of 48, or 63%)           
commented that they preferred e-voting as      
they found it “easier”, “more convenient” and       
“simpler” than paper ballots. The next reason       
appears security: 21 voters (44%) mentioned      
that the ability to verify the vote made them         
feel “safer” and “more secure”, as one voter        
commented: “I can double check my vote, it        
seems more secure/protected than hand     
counting paper ballots”. Another voter     
commented: “Given a receipt at the end gives        
assurance that vote is counted”. The third       
reason is the speed of voting: 20 voters (42%)         
 commented that they preferred e-voting as      
they found it “quicker”, and “faster”. This is        
corroborated by the mean voting time of 33        
seconds reported earlier. Besides these three,      
other reasons mentioned in the comments      
included the use of e-voting being more       
“cost-effective” (4 voters) and more     
“environment-friendly” (1 voter). 
Among those preferring or strongly preferring       
paper ballots (20), all of them provided written        
comments to explain their choice. Based on       
the comments, two main reasons can be       
identified. The first is down to the habituation:        
10 voters (out of 20, or 50%) commented that         
they were a “traditionalist”, “accustomed [to      
paper]” and “like the ritual of casting the paper         
vote”. One voter commented: “[paper voting]      
has worked for hundreds of years. Why       
change it now just because we can?” The        
second reason concerns the security: 8 voters       
(40%) mentioned security as a reason they       
preferred paper ballots. One voter commented:      
“I think a computerized system could be easily        
hacked which could affect the outcome of the        
ballot”. Another commented: “I would not be       
confident in the security of a system of this         
nature. It could be open to hacking or other         
manipulation”. It is worth noting that “security”       
was one main reason for both liking and        
disliking the trialed e-voting system. Other      
reasons mentioned in the comments included      
the paper ballot being “simpler” (1 voter),       
“quicker” (1 voter) and that the use of e-voting         
might disenfranchise people who “have     
disabilities and/or dyslexia” or “do not use       
computers” (2 voters).  
Among those choosing “neutral” (16), 13       
provided further comments. The comments     
mentioned a range of reasons, such as       
simplicity, speed, security and tradition as      
covered above. One factor not covered before       
is that some voters chose “neutral” as they did         
not like coming to the polling station to vote, as          
one commented: “Not much time difference to       
actual voting [between paper and e-voting] - if I         
were able to do online and at home would be          
more beneficial.”  
 
Limitations and future work. ​The Gateshead      
trial was the first study to assess the feasibility         
of touch-screen based E2E verifiable e-voting      
for polling station voting. Although the user       
feedback shows a clear preference on the       
trialed e-voting system over paper ballots,      
several limitations of this study should be       
noted. First, the trial was confined to one        
polling station in a north-east region of the UK.         
Whether the result can be generalized to the        
whole voting population remains to be      
investigated. Second, the number of     
participants in the trial (94) was relatively       
small. Third, as the participation of the trial was         
entirely voluntary, there may be a      
self-selection bias on the survey result. Fourth,       
in the trial, only the usability of voting is         
evaluated, not the usability of verification.      
These limitations will need to be addressed in        
further studies, e.g., by conducting more trials       
in distributed regions. Finally, a trial to       
compare E2E verifiable Internet voting and      
postal voting under a remote voting setting has        
not been carried out before and will be        
worthwhile to conduct as a future work.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper summarises the results of the       
Gateshead e-voting trial, which was the first       
time that a fully electronic voting system with        
E2E verifiability was tested for polling station       
voting. Feedback from the participants in this       
trial indicates a clear preference of verifiable       
e-voting over the traditional paper ballots. This       
is because many voters considered the former       
“safer”, “more secure”, “quicker” and “easier to       
use”. This shows the promising potential of       
deploying E2E verifiable e-voting in future      
elections. However, this trial also shows that       
20 out of the 91 participants (22%) still        
preferred or strongly preferred paper voting.      
This indicates that deployment of e-voting in       
any real-world election should be progressed      
with caution and a considerate plan to support        
every voter, especially those who may be       
unfamiliar with e-voting or dislike it.  
The Gateshead trial was conducted for a        
dummy election, within the existing legal      
 
 framework of the UK election law, which only        
allows paper ballots for statutory voting. The       
results of this trial hopefully present a useful        
case study for voting policy makers with regard        
to the UK election law, which was written at a          
time when paper ballots were the only possible        
means of voting, but has not been updated to         
account for many developments of digital      
technologies in the modern era.  
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